Theory and Reform of Criminal Law by Hall, Jerome
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1978
Theory and Reform of Criminal Law
Jerome Hall
University of California, Hastings College of the Law*
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hall, Jerome, "Theory and Reform of Criminal Law" (1978). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 1459.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1459
Theory and Reform of Criminal Law
By JEROME HALL*
Theory
Theory and practice are interdependent. Far from being merely
academic, the theory of any field comprises the most important part
of the knowledge of that subject and, consequently, guides the practice
of the relevant discipline or profession. Similarly, theory is illumi-
nated and often modified when it is tested in practice. Thus, the
theorist and the practitioner go hand-in-hand; both are essential par-
ticipants in a common enterprise.
In this Article the subject of theory and practice is American
criminal law, an application and modification of English common law
that goes back in an unbroken line to the thirteenth century. The
reports of the Anglo-American criminal law cases, whose rich signifi-
cance is unique among legal systems, are the most valuable repository
of the moral and legal experience of the English-speaking peoples.
If we add to that the fact that sound criminal law is an essential factor
in the survival and well-being of society, that, more than any other
branch of the law, it has dramatic interest for the entire community
and that the values it protects also concern every thoughtful lawyer,
it is plain that the advance of our knowledge of criminal law is a
matter of paramount importance.
There are many kinds of knowledge, ranging from the individual-
ized knowledge of the artist, the historian, and the expert, and the
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intuitive know-how of an experienced trial lawyer to the organized
general knowledge of physics and mathematics. There is also inter-
disciplinary knowledge, and because law is a cultural datum or arti-
fact and because, as Savigny put it, "its essence is the life of man
itself,"1 law can be elucidated and illuminated by drawing on many
relevant disciplines. A study of the law of theft, for example, made
use of economic history, especially that of the Industrial Revolution,
the sociological theory of the "case history" and methods of empirical
research, statistics, and the philosophy of science. 2  So, too, in ad-
vancing knowledge of the law on mental illness and criminal respon-
sibility, one turns to psychiatry, fully cognizant that some psychiatric
theories, for example, determinism, conflict with the moral postulates
of criminal law and must be critically examined and sometimes re-
jected or at least interpreted in ways that are consistent with those
postulates which, in turn, may be reassessed. In this country, prob-
ably more than in any other, interest in interdisciplinary study ac-
companied a vast expansion of the social sciences, not all of which
is helpful either to the practitioner or the legal scholar.3
A different direction is taken in this Article. Borrowing from
science and the logic of codification, this Article will focus first on the
organization or systematization of the criminal law. Such analysis
is far from being a mere exercise in logic; on the contrary, just as the
systematization of the laws of physics illuminates every one of those
laws, so, too, the significant organization of the numerous propositions
of criminal law adds greatly to our knowledge of that law. Because
the substantive criminal law is expressed in the general terms of
statutes and decisions, it is general knowledge that is of primary rele-
vance, and such knowledge has reached its greatest development in
physics and mathematics. What is distinctive in these sciences is the
high degree of organization of their generalizations; in a strict sense
they are systematic bodies of knowledge. 4
1. F. VON SAVIGNY, OF -IHE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURIS-
PRUDENCE ( 1831 ), quoted in J. HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1973).
2. J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1952). See also Blakey & Gold-
smith, Criminal Redistribution of Stolen Property: The Need for Law Reform, 74
MICH. L. REV. 1512 (1976).
3. Hall, Science, Common Sense and Criminal Law Reform, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1044
(1964).
4. "Science searches for relations . . . its coherent systems." Einstein, quoted in
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 779 (H. FeigI & M. Brodbeck, eds. 1953).
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Building on the suggestiveness of scientific knowledge and seek-
ing a similar goal, I first distinguish three types of generalization that
comprise the substantive criminal law, namely, "rules," "doctrines,"
and "principles," terms that represent progressively wider concepts.
"Rules" state what is distinctive in each crime, for example, the ma-
terial elements of larceny and robbery, including the particular mens
rea of each crime without reference to justification or excuse. These
normal definitions as regards mens rea are qualified by more general
propositions usually called "defenses," such as those concerning in-
fancy, insanity, ignorance or mistake, coercion, self-defense, and neces-
sity, propositions that I have called "doctrines." In addition to the
above doctrines of excuse and justification, there are doctrines con-
cerning complicity, solicitation, conspiracy and attempt, that is, rela-
tional doctrines. When all the doctrines are applied to all the rules,
a minimal statement of the criminal law of any country is expressed.
But in advanced legal systems there is an additional feature that must
be recognized; indeed, by reference to a science of criminal law, this
feature is the most important of all. Thus, if one envisages the union
of all the rules and all the doctrines and tries to discover the basic
ideas which permeate that combined set of propositions, one may
derive the ultimate categories, the principles, of criminal law, namely,
legality, mens rea, effort (or "act"), the fusion of mens rea with effort
(or act) to comprise conduct, harm, the causal relation between con-
duct and harm, and the punitive nature of the sanction. In sum, we
have thus far distinguished three kinds of propositions comprising the
substantive criminal law and have noted some of their interrelations,
viz., that the rules are limited by the doctrines and that the principles
are implicit in that combination of rules and doctrines.
Let us take a closer look at some of the above interrelations.
For example, the principle of mens rea is derived from all the relevant
doctrines, such as insanity and mistake, and also from the significance
of the "normal" mentes reae described in the rules. The defendant
frequently does not plead an excuse or justification; he simply denies
that he did what is charged in the indictment. If he is found guilty,
his mens rea is the "normal" one expressed in the rules minus the
doctrines, that is, he was a sane adult, knew the facts, and was not
acting in self defense, for example, and, therefore, was neither justified
nor excused. And if we ask, as we should, why was he not justified
or excused, we can state the answer in terms of the ultimate principles
of the criminal law without implying that justification and excuse are
wholly absorbed in those principles. It should be added that, al-
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though the principles are "ultimate" in the above indicated sense,
they must be distinguished from the simple unity characteristic of
physical concepts. For example, mens rea is a fusion of cognition
and volition, and the fact that mens rea adds meaning to the other
principles implies that they, too, are not simple concepts. Thus, the
principle of causation, linking conduct to harm, is qualified by the
meaning of mens rea; if mens rea is limited to intentionality and reck-
lessness, that is, to mental states expressed in voluntary conduct, that
limitation restricts the meaning of causation to end-seeking or author-
ship in contrast with the meaning of causation as the co-variation of
facts; for example, increase in volume varies with increase in tempera-
ture. Again, mens rea qualifies "harm;" it is not simply a death or
loss of possession that is a harm in penal law but a death or loss of
possession caused voluntarily (mens rea) by, for example, a sane,
sober adult without justification or excuse. So too, harm must be
related to "mens rea" to define the latter concept; for example, it is
intentionally or recklessly committing a proscribed harm, not mens
rea in isolation, that determines the meaning of "mens rea." Like-
wise, harm as a bridge between voluntary misconduct and punish-
ment gives "punishment" a congruent meaning. Finally, the princi-
ple of legality serves as the formal vehicle to place definite bounds
on all concepts and propositions of penal law. I trust that the above
brief discussion of a large subject will suffice to indicate the con-
textual significance of interrelated criminal law propositions and the
desirability of organizing that corpus juris.
The organization of the criminal law rests on logical grounds.
But if the rules and doctrines are not substantively sound, the prin-
ciples drawn from them and, indeed, the entire resulting structure,
though logically valid, might be vulnerable to the severest criticism;
the harshest dictatorship might have a system of "criminal law."
Penal statutes may be unsound inter alia because they conflict with
basic values or because they concern trivial affairs or problems best
left to other agencies. In this Article, I shall restrict inquiry to the
ethics of criminal law, indeed, to the principal moral postulate on
which the common law of crimes rests, namely, that only voluntary
conduct that inflicts a harm definitely proscribed by criminal law is
a crime. This postulate does not imply that the criminal law is or
should be based only on retributive justice because it is apparent
that the above moral postulate is also consistent with a utilitarian
perspective that regards criminal action as the consequence of weigh-
ing the advantage of a contemplated crime against the disadvantage
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
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of the potential punishment. The above moral postulate is recom-
mended by the fact of its survival for thousands of years, extending,
as it does, from Aristotle to the present time. That postulate means
simply that one is to be praised or blamed for what he voluntarily
does or omits doing. By reference to that basic postulate stem the
defenses, the doctrines that take their meaning in terms of either ex-
cuse or justification. But perhaps most persuasive is the fact that
the above moral postulate is exemplified in the case law on the felonies
and major misdemeanors. Its adoption as the central moral postulate
of the criminal law is not the imposition on that law of an external
standard plucked from moral philosophy; it is, on the contrary, im-
plicit in the common law of those crimes.
This restriction of criminal law to voluntary wrongdoing raises
questions about inadvertent negligence and strict liability. As to the
latter, it will suffice to note that it is universally recognized that those
offenses are not really crimes; the exclusion of mens rea has suggested
that they be designated "public torts, "quasi-crimes," "regulatory
offenses," "infractions," or "violations" and, also, that they be located
in statutes outside the criminal code.
With regard to negligence, the late Professor Turner of Cambridge
University wrote, "[lilt should now be recognized that at common law
there is no criminal liability for harm thus caused by inadvertence
. . -"5 But legislation has altered that firm and sustained judicial
adherence to the basic moral postulate of penal law, and we now
have such statutes as California Penal Code section 192(3b) on vehicle
manslaughter,6 and in some states, statutory manslaughter other than
by vehicle also requires only proof of negligence.
7
The soundness of such legislation has been widely debated in
many countries, and opposed positions have been taken by able schol-
ars both in this country and abroad. The positions reflect differences
in moral philosophy or concern for practical expediency, for example,
a belief that something must be done to negligent drivers and that,
in the absence of other better controls, the punitive sanction should
be employed. This Article is not the place to amplify or even to
5. J. W. C. TURNER, KENNY'S OUrLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW I 25, at 38 (19th ed.
1966) (footnotes omitted).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(3b) (West 1970).
7. E.g., State v. Williams, 4 Wash. App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 (1971).
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summarize that wide-ranging polemic.8 What must be stated here
is that if we are to organize our knowledge of criminal law, it is
necessary to omit negligence from the relevant field. The reason for
that is simply that any valid descriptive generalization, including the
factual implications of the various propositions of criminal law, sub-
sumes a unified field of data. Negligence is the contrary of intentional
or reckless misconduct which is characterized by awareness or ad-
vertence. The inclusion of both awareness and inadvertence in
"mens rea" makes that term a confused or merely formal concept.
Moreover, the related concepts of causation, harm, and punishment
are also confused when "mens rea" includes such disparate states of
mind. Obviously, so long as negligence continues to be proscribed,
practicing lawyers must accept that fact. But their treatment of
negligent conduct depends on their knowledge of the law concerning
voluntary misconduct because the one is the contrary of the other.
In sum, regardless of one's view of the desirability of penalizing negli-
gent behavior, the organization of the knowledge of penal law, that
is, of propositions that are valid only if limited to the same kind of
data, has logical demands that are inexorable.
The organization of the criminal law, expressing its contextual
significance, and its foundation in a basic moral principle provide the
general outline of the policy that should guide reform. When we
study specific problems, this perspective may recede or even be for-
gotten in our concentration on technical or linguistic issues; but a
logic that is the tool of a sound policy will eventually compel the test
of consistency.
Reform
The objectives of reform are (a) to preserve what is sound in
the criminal code and jurisprudence, (b) to improve that law, and
(c) to organize the statutes along lines previously discussed, i.e., a
General Part consisting of (a) Principles and (b) Doctrines, and a
part on Specific Crimes. Obviously, when the objectives are stated
so broadly, there is, correspondingly, a very large array of problems
that must be dealt with in improving the criminal law of any state.9
8. See Hall, Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded From Penal Liability, 63
COLUal. L. REv'. 632 (1963), which includes references to writers having opposed views
on this subject.
9. See Wechsler, The Challenge of A Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1097
(1952).
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But instead of a wide survey of the field, it will be more helpful to
limit the discussion to a few problems in California criminal law that
are also typical of the problems met in many other states.
Resolving Ambiguities
A number of principles in California criminal law require refine-
ment and clarification. One is the degree of necessary force which
may be used to protect persons or property. California criminal law,
usually in the forefront, lagged behind other states in limiting the
degree of force a police officer can justifiably use in arrest for com-
mission of a felony. Only recently did California law limit the use
of deadly force to violent felonies or cases in which the fleeing felon
possesses a lethal weapon;' 0 in effect, nonviolent felonies are now
classed with misdemeanors for that purpose. What calls for clarifi-
cation in the California law are questions raised by People v. Ceballos."
In that case the defendant's conviction for assault with a deadly wea-
pon for use of a trap gun was affirmed notwithstanding decisions to
the effect that the shooting might have been justified had he been
present at the time of the illegal entry of his home.
Also requiring clarification is the liability of one who goes to
the rescue of a person who he mistakenly but reasonably believes is
the victim of an attack but who actually is attacking a police officer.
The alter ego rule adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in
People v. Young' 2 has not helped to clarify this problem; because not-
withstanding the fact that the charge in Young was for a third degree
assault which under New York law required no mens rea or at least
not the usual mens rea of common law assault, that decision has been
variously interpreted. The dissenting opinion in that case would
make reasonable mistake a defense,' 3 and by reference to the policy
discussed above the only pertinent issue is whether an unreasonable
mistake should also be a defense. In any case, although recent deci-
sions are suggestive of a trend, the ambiguity of Ceballos, though not
10. People v. Piorkowski, 41 Cal. App. 3d 324, 115 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1974).
11. 12 Cal. 3d 470, 526 P.2d 241, 116 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1974). The facts in this
case, involving a trap gun, raise questions about statements in the opinion regarding the
right of an occupant confronted by a burglar in his house at night.
12. People v. Young, 11 N.Y.2d 274, 183 N.E.2d 319, 229 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962).
13. Id. at 276-79, 183 N.E.2d at 320-22, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 3-6 (Froesell & Van Voor-
his, JJ., dissenting).
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directly relevant to the defense of a third person, as well as the paucity
of California law on the latter situation, call for clarification of this
segment of the law.14
A similar question must be raised about battery in California law.
It is clear that assault in California (stated in common law terms of
"attempted battery") must be intentional and that "intentionality" is
not a synonym or the equivalent of "recklessness." It seems equally
clear in this common law view that every battery includes an assault;
but does it imply that it does not also include a reckless battery?
Some states recognize reckless assaults and reckless batteries and still
others, intentional assaults and reckless batteries. People v. Lathus-'
casts doubt on the question of reckless battery in California. The
judgment reached there raises doubts because the court identified
very reckless conduct with intentional conduct, implying at the same
time that it regarded intention as the requisite mens rea in battery.
But the fact that battery includes the common law assault does not
imply that it is limited to intentional contact; just as assault in some
states includes both common law assault and intentionally frightening
someone, so, too, it is possible to extend battery to include contact
that was not intentional. The term used in California Penal Code
section 24216 is "willful," which would include recklessness, but the
recent trend is to restrict battery to intentionally caused contacts.17
On the other hand, such grossly reckless conduct as that in Lathus
calls for appropriate penalization which does not strain current law.
The ambiguities in this area of California law should be resolved.
A third area of uncertainty concerns "coercion." Until very re-
cently, California law adhered closely to the common law requirements
that the threat must be of death or great injury, that it must be im-
minent, that there be no way of escape from that perilous situation
14. See Cal. S.B. 565 §§ 4302, 4601(b) (1975).
15. 35 Cal. App. 3d 466, 471, 110 Cal. Rptr. 921, 924 (1973). This is not resolved
in Cal. S.B. 565 § 7302 (1975). In Lathus, the court said: "Reckless conduct alone
does not constitute a sufficient basis for assault or for battery even if the assault results
in an injury to another." 35 Cal. App. 3d at 469, 110 Cal. Rtpr. at 923. Then it added:
"However, when an act inherently dangerous to others is committed with a conscious
disregard of human life and safety, the act transcends recklessness, and the intent to
commit the battery is presumed." Id. at 470, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 924. See also Regina
v. Belfon, [1976] 3 All E.R. 46, 53.
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West 1970).
17. See W. LA FAVE & A. Scor, CRIMINAL LAW 605 n.15 (1972).
[Vol. 29
May 1978] THEORY AND REFORM OF CRIMINAL LAW 901
and, finally, as to murder, that coercion can never be a defense.,8
People v. Lovercamp'" departed from the common law and followed
decisions in other states expanding coercion in cases of escape from
prison for fear of homosexual attack. 0  More suggestive still is the
decision of the English Court of Appeal in Regina v. Hudson and
Regina v. Taylor" where two women, threatened with severe beatings
by gangsters, committed perjury as witnesses in a prosecution against
members of the gang. Their conviction for perjury was reversed and
"coercion" was recognized as a defense notwithstanding the fact that
the defendants lied in a courtroom, where they were not under threat
of immediate serious injury, and notwithstanding the fact that they
could have asked for police protection. The court of appeal took a
realistic view of the pressure on these defendants at the time they
testified and of the protection the police could actually provide out-
side the courtroom.
General Intent and Specific Intent
Among problems of a different order is that raised by the terms
"general intent" and "specific intent," which have their origin in deci-
sions on charges of murder by grossly intoxicated defendants. In
seeking to mitigate the rigor of the law without at the same time ap-
proving voluntary intoxication, the judges said they would simply
recognize the actual state of the defendant's mind and if that excluded
a necessary mens rea, the judgment would have to take account of
that. Apparently, the simplest way to reach this result was to say
that in crimes that required a specific intent intoxication could be
used to exclude that mens rea. This cautious statement made it pos-
sible in the then accepted view to hold intoxicated offenders guilty
of lesser included crimes that did not require a specific intent, such
as manslaughter or assault.
18. Cf. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Lynch [1975] A. C. 653, which allowed
a defense of coercion to a principal in the second degree, and Regina v. Kray [1969]
53 Crim. App. 569, which recognized coercion as a defense by an accessory before the
fact.
19. 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974). Cf. People v. Richards, 269
Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969) (upon offer of proof of infliction of acts
of sodomy and threats of death the claim of necessity was rejected).
20. See, e.g., People v. Harman, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974); ac-
cord, People v. Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 232 N.W.2d 184 (1975).
21. Reported in Regina v. Hudson, [1971] 2 Q.B. 202 (C.A.).
The consequent problem arose from the fact that "specific intent"
naturally suggested "general intent." Much confusion followed the
use of "general intent" and "specific intent" because it was assumed
that the former, no less than the latter, was a descriptive term; hence,
in assault with a deadly weapon, manslaughter, and rape, for example,
one searches for an elusive general intent.22
The fact is that every intention is specific in that it embodies
an intention to focus on one or more definite objectives. Although
in a loose sense one may say, for example, that he intends to do every-
thing possible to advance humanity or his own career (which is better
stated in terms of planning or having an ideal or ambition), both
clarity and precision require that, when one says that he intends to
do x, the x refer to something definite. If then, at least within the
limits of penal discourse, "general intent" does not describe any actual
state of mind, it must be viewed as a technical term, like "continuing
trespass," employed to serve a purpose, such as holding defendants
criminally liable for some crimes notwithstanding the fact that they
were so intoxicated as to escape liability for a more serious crime.
That purpose can be served if, instead of "general" and "specific,"
the terms "simple" and "complex" are used to designate, respectively,
the mens rea of such crimes as assault and burglary. Alternatively,
that purpose can be met by omitting both adjectives and saying simply
that the mens rea required in a particular crime was not proved to
exist because part of it or all of it was not proved to exist. This
22. In People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 458, 462 P.2d 370, 377, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618.
626 (1969), Chief Justice Traynor called the difference "chimerical." Similar doubts
were expressed in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan, [1975] A.C. 182. Cali-
fornia cases hold that rape does not require specific intent. People v. Franklin, 56 Cal.
App. 3d 18, 128 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1976); People v. Butcher, 174 Cal. App. 2d 722,
349 P.2d 127 (1959). But in a felony-murder context it was held that evidence of
diminished capacity could negate "specific intent" where the underlying felony is rape.
People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969). In People
v. Nance, 25 Cal. App. 3d 925, 102 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1972), a diminished capacity in-
struction was disallowed in the case of arson, which the court termed a "general intent"
crime, but was allowed as to burglary. Of course, burning one's own house is very rare
but so, too, is breaking into one's own house. Yet both situations can occur; this raises
a question regarding the above alleged difference in the mens rea in arson and burglary.
In People v. Lerma, 66 Mich. App. 566, 569, 239 N.W.2d 422, 425 (1976), although
the court seemed to agree that "specific intent cannot be meaningfully distinguished
from a general intent," it nonetheless proceeded to distinguish them in terms that com-
pound the difficulty. Cf. People v. Rocha, 3 Cal. 3d 893, 479 P.2. 372, 92 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1971) (assault with a deadly weapon held to be a general intent crime). On "general
intent," see State v. Farris, 218 Kan. 136, 542 P.2d 725 (1975); on "specific intent," see
Steubgen v. State, 548 P.2d 870, 875-76 (Wyo. 1976).
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approach would avoid clouding analysis with speculation about an
imagined "'general intention" and with attempts to differentiate
that intent from the superfluously characterized specific intent; in
addition, it would bring into focus the necessary reliance on fact to
establish any required mens rea, whether simple or complex.
There are other more challenging problems regarding the mens
rea and the criminal liability of grossly intoxicated offenders. In
England, for example, legal scholars have pressed for complete ex-
culpation from liability even for assault;23 and it must be granted
that the current rationale of liability of grossly intoxicated offenders
does not fare well under sustained analysis. For example, in homi-
cides by grossly intoxicated offenders, the current rationale posits lia-
bility for second degree murder or manslaughter on voluntary intoxi-
cation; that reasoning may have been persuasive in the nineteenth
century, but now it raises difficult problems.24
Diminished Capacity
From its beginnings in People v. Wells25 and People v. Gorshen26
to People v. Wolff27 and People v. Conley,28 and up to the present time,
California courts have been sensitive to pleas of diminished capacity.
The subject merits thorough study and detailed analysis, but it is
possible here to discuss only some aspects of Conley, where the issue
was the validity of a conviction for first degree murder. The origin
of diminished capacity both in England and in this country was in
decisions rendered in homicide cases where the courts recognized
gross intoxication as mitigating or exculpatory. In California, where
there are degrees of murder, diminished capacity includes not only
intoxication but also "trauma, disease, or defect" and lowers liability
to voluntary manslaughter or, in extreme intoxication, to involuntary
manslaughter. 29
23. See Director of Public Prosecutions v. Majewski, [1976] 62 Crim. App. 5, es-
pecially Lord Edmund Davies' opinion.
24. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMIIAL LAw, 529-57 (2d ed. 1960);
Kendall v. State, 244 Miss. 618, 145 So. 2d 924 (1962).
25. 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
26. 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959).
27. 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
28. 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
29. People v. Ray, 14 Cal. 3d 20, 533 P.2d 1017, 120 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975). There
are decisions or dicta to the effect that diminished capacity is a defense to other crimes,
e.g., aggravated assault, People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949); issuing
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In order to appreciate the strategy of Conley we must place the
California Supreme Court's reversal of the lower court's opinion in the
context of the guiding lines and limitations within which that judg-
ment had to be reached. One relevant factor to be overcome was
that in other states gross intoxication in homicide cases was held to
exclude only premeditation, leaving those offenders guilty of murder
in the second degree. That solution, probably influenced by an in-
herited bias against voluntary intoxication, hardly comports with the
inebriate's actual mental condition; nor does it provide a persuasive
reason for the imposed liability because murder in the second degree
requires at least a very reckless killing.
The other guiding factor was that malice is a material element
of both degrees of murder in California. In Conley, therefore, it was
necessary not only to eliminate malice if the homicide was to be
reduced to manslaughter but, also, to recognize the corollary, that
malice must not be treated as synonymous with premeditated intent.
For if the two concepts were synonymous, the elimination of pre-
meditation would not have reduced liability to manslaughter which,
in the California court's perception of the nature of diminished
capacity, was the required judgment.
"Malice," abandoned in the Model Penal Code and in states
that have been influenced by it, including New York, 30 is a trouble-
some term. In the first place, "malice" cannot mean malice in the
dictionary sense because that usage would exclude well-motivated
homicides, such as some cases of euthanasia. But, second, because
"malice" is part of the law of murder in California, it had to be given
a meaning that connotes culpability, but at the same time avoids the
dictionary meaning. How can that result be achieved?
The classical definition of "malice" - an intentional killing with-
out justification or excuse and not reducible to manslaughter - is
checks without funds, People v. Gentry, 257 Cal. App. 2d 607, 65 Cal. Rptr. 235
(1968); theft, Jamison v. State, 53 Okla. Crim. 59, 7 P.2d 171 (1932); forgery, requiring
"specific intent" to defraud, State v. Conklin, 79 Wash. 2d 805, 489 P.2d 1130 (1971).
burglary, People v. Taylor, 220 Cal. App. 2d 212, 33 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1963). In
McCarthy v. State, 372 A.2d 180 (Del. Super. Ct.), a plea of diminished capacity
was rejected as regards rape, attempted rape, and kidnapping, the court holding that
diminished capacity is applicable only to crimes that include a lesser crime requiring
only "general intent."
30. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (NIcKinney 1975); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2
(proposed official draft, 1962). So, too, in Cal. S.B. 565 § 7001(a)(1) (1975).
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more methodological than descriptive of a state of mind; most of it
tells us only where malice is to be found. The issue in diminished
capacity obviously concerns mens rea; accordingly, moving within the
above guidelines, Conley held that "the court or a jury could conclude
that the defendant killed intentionally, with premeditation and de-
liberation, but did not do so with malice aforethought."31 Having
taken that important step but still saddled with the need to give
"malice" a defensible meaning, Chief Justice Traynor said:
An intentional act that is highly dangerous to human life, done
in disregard of the actor's awareness that society requires him
to conform his conduct to the law is done with malice regardless
of the fact that the actor acts without ill will toward his victim
or believes that his conduct is justified.3 -2
And in his concluding remarks he added, "Although legally sane ac-
cording to the M'Naghten test, such a defendant could not be con-
victed of murder if mental illness prevented his acting with malice
aforethought."33  In sum, an offender suffering from diminished ca-
pacity is not "capable . . .of comprehending the duty society places
on all persons to act within the law,"3 4 but he does have the capacity
to understand or appreciate the nature of his act and that it is wrong.
The need for further elucidation is evident especially in California
because the evidence admitted in the first stage of trial, where dimin-
ished capacity is in issue, must be distinguished from the evidence
admissible in the second stage, where insanity is the only issue. That
the above formula was intended to apply only to diminished capacity,
which was in issue in Conley, and cannot be an implication of
M'Naghten3 5 is shown by the fact that in Conley the exclusion of
malice ends in liability for manslaughter while in insanity cases the
state of mind described in M'Naghten leads to complete exculpation.
The logic of this differentiation implies that in diminished capacity
there is sufficient mens rea for liability for manslaughter while in in-
sanity not only malice but, also, other relevant mental conditions are
absent. It should be recalled that in Conley, because the appeal was
from a conviction for murder in the first degree, it was sufficient for
reversal to exclude malice; it was not necessary to compare the above
31. 64 Cal. 2d at 323, 411 P.2d at 919, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
32. Id. at 322, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
33. Id. at 323, 411 P.2d at 919, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
34. Id. at 322, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
35. 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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formula regarding diminished capacity with California's liberalized
M'Naghten test.
If malice were omitted from a future statutory definition of
murder, a court dealing with diminished capacity would presumably
instruct a jury in terms of the difference in the degree of incapacity
between insanity and diminished capacity. 3 But how significant
would that be regarding "disease," "defect," and "trauma;" does the
last include the traumatic experience of one who learns of his wife's
infidelity and in a highly emotional state kills after "cooling time"
has expired? 37 Is "disease" different from "defect," and are they
limited to physical or physiological abnormalities, or do they open the
door to a search for any deviation from normal competence short of
psychosis?
In some cases it is possible to recognize persons of diminished
capacity and to distinguish them from psychotics. There are, for
example, the cases of Nevares, 3s who had suffered a serious head
injury and filed a plea of insanity, and Fisher,39 a dull-witted alcoholic
who could only do janitorial chores and that in a minimal way. It
seems probable that neither Nevares nor Fisher had suffered so great
a breach from reality or loss of intelligence as not to be able to under-
stand what he was doing and that it was wrong. But the need to
distinguish persons of diminished capacity from normal persons re-
veals the complexity of the issue. Although "psychosis" itself is a
vague term, the popular view of it, supported by psychiatric evidence
of a sharp breach with reality, renders defensible, though certainly
debatable, the conclusion that valid judgments can be made regarding
that part of the continuum, on the assumption that the recognized
tests of insanity are a definite anchor at one end of the scale. But
when we scrutinize the other end of the continuum and the need to
36. The problem of mental illness, intoxication and other addiction is a large and
difficult one. In California, a thorough inquiry would take account of all relevant laws.
e.g., the liberalized 'M'Naghten rule, the extant law on diminished capacity, the result
of decisions favorable to the defense in both situations, especially the question of com-
pulsory commitment, the burden of proof, and other pertinent laws.
37. See People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573
(1976). In California there appears to be no case interpreting "trauma" in relation
to diminished capacity. In People v. Burns, 88 Cal. App. 2d 867, 873-74, 200 P.2d
134, 137-38 (1948), the court, citing several dictionary definitions and two Kentucky
cases, defined "traumatic conditions," contained in former California Penal Code § 273d.
as a wound or physical injury whether resulting from external physical force or not.
38. State v. Nevares, 36 N.M. 41, 7 P.2d 933 (1932).
39. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
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distinguish persons of diminished capacity from "normal" ones, ques-
tions arise that cast doubt on "diminished capacity."40 Until that
concept is elucidated much more thoroughly than the present deci-
sions allow, unless, perhaps, definite physical or physiological symp-
toms, as in gross intoxication, are required, "diminished capacity" sails
on an ocean that is as turbulent as it is uncharted.
The most that we can say now, limited by our present lack of
study and authoritative clues, is that it may be possible to recognize
specific instances of abnormality and to realize that they are mani-
fested in a continuum; but it is quite another task to formulate the
differences of degree in ways that help the triers of the facts to reach
sound decisions. Perhaps we shall eventually conclude that it is pref-
erable to follow the example of foreign codes that treat diminished
capacity as meriting mitigation of punishment, not as a defense. 41
Felony-Murder
That the California law on felony-murder is very much in need
of reform can hardly be doubted. That ancient rule has been abol-
ished in England, 42 and judicial restrictions of it in many states sup-
port the negative attitude towards a rule that is so plainly at odds
with the principle of mens rea. This is evident in California where
even an accidental killing in the commission of one of six specified
felonies is murder in the first degree, while in other states the killing
must be very reckless, indicating the minimally desirable change in
40. In England diminished responsibility is limited to reduction of murder to man-
slaughter "if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from
a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or in-
duced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility .... "
Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 2. In Regina v. Byrne (1960] 2 Q.B. 396,
403, Lord Chief Justice Parker said: "'Abnormality of mind' ... means a state of mind
so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it
abnormal." Lady Wootton found cases, e.g., of euthanasia, where a plea of diminished
responsibility was successful despite the absence of any evidence of mental abnormality.
B. Woo-roN, CRmE AND mE CRIMINAL LAw 72-73 (1963).
41. Foreign codes typically treat diminished capacity as a means to mitigate pun-
ishment, not as a defense that may reduce the charge. See, e.g., GERMAN PENAL CODE
§ 51(2) (1871); Swiss FEDERAL PENAL CODE Art. 11 (1937); KOREAN PENAL CODE
Art. 10, § 2 (1953). See also Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Re-
sponsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 CoLum. L. REv. 827
(1977).
42. Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 1.
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the current California law. 43  The needed reform was implied in
Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in People v. Thomas,44 where he
said that California Penal Code section 1894- does not make any
"killing" in the course of one of the proscribed felonies murder in the
first degree but is in terms of "murder" in the course of one of those
felonies. Notwithstanding that pointed observation, California judges
have not limited the felony-murder rule in that way; indeed, the
clearest part of the California law on this entire subject is that even
a purely accidental killing suffices for murder in the first degree.
It is necessary to keep in mind that this rigorous rule is applicable
to the usual situation where the felon directly does the killing if we
are to understand the more complicated decisions in cases where a
policeman or the intended victim kills; in the California cases dis-
cussed below one of the felons was killed by a third party and the
surviving felon was charged with murder in the first degree for that
death.
We shall limit this 'iscussion to the four principal decisions, the
first of which is People v. Washington,40 where the defendant's ac-
complice was killed by the intended victim of a robbery. Conviction
of first degree murder was reversed, and the plain import of Wash-
ington is shown not only by the language of Chief Justice Traynor's
opinion - "Section 189 requires that the felon or his accomplice com-
mit the killing, for if he does not, the killing is not committed to
perpetrate the felony"'4 - but also by the fact that Washington was
decided after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had reversed earlier
convictions based on "proximate causation"4s and also after the New
York Court of Appeals limited its felony-murder rule to killings directly
committed by the felon or his accomplice. 411
One year after Washington came People v. Gilbert50 and with
it the regrettable complexity of felony-murder law in California. One
may surmise that Gilbert represented a reconsideration of the problem
43. We are not discussing the case of the robber or rapist who, after committing
the felony, deliberately kills his helpless victim. We are concerned here only with kill-
ings that occur in furtherance of or in flight from the proscribed felony.
44. 41 Cal. 2d 470, 477, 261 P.2d 1, 4 (1953).
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1970).
46. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
47. Id. at 781, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
48. Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961).
49. People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 167 N.E.2d 736, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1960)
50. 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
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and a backing away from the limitation on felony-murder laid down
in Washington. Gilbert involved three robbers, one of whom, fleeing,
shot and killed a policeman, while another police officer shot and killed
one of the other felons. The two surviving felons were found guilty
of murder in the first degree for the death of their accomplice. That
conviction was reversed on the ground that the trial court had in-
structed in terms of "proximate cause" - the rationale rejected in
Pennsylvania in a detailed analysis of the difference between "causa-
tion" in tort and in criminal law. But, although it reversed the con-
viction, Gilbert laid down a new rule, namely, that where a felon
initiates a gun battle and a police officer or an intended victim responds
in like manner, killing someone, the felon is guilty of murder in the
first degree. This was based on a single statement in Washington:
"Defendants who initiate gun battles may also be found guilty of
murder if their victims resist and kill."51 After writing that statement,
Chief Justice Traynor returned to the central ratio of Washington,
namely, "the act of killing must be committed by the .defendant or
by his accomplice acting in furtherance of their common design."'5 -2
Gilbert was plainly a leap from the proposition that a felon who
initiates a gun battle is guilty of "murder" to the conclusion that
Penal Code section 189 must be applied to make it murder in the
first degree.
That may have been dicta in Gilbert, but it was made law in
Taylor v. Superior Court,53 which, again, involved three felons, this
time attempting robbery in a liquor store. Two of them entered the
store, one of them, Daniels, making threats. The intended victim's
wife shot and killed Smith, the other felon in the store; and Taylor,
who was outside in the get-away car, was convicted (4-3) of first
degree felony-murder of Smith - again in reliance on the statement
in Washington regarding initiation of a gun battle. We need not be
concented here with the sequence, where Daniels was separately tried
and acquitted, and Taylor's conviction was set aside on the ground
of "collateral estoppel." 54  But it should be noted that Taylor first
repeated the above Washington statement and did not until three
pages into the opinion state that such a felon is guilty of "first degree
51. 62 Cal. 2d at 782, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
52. Id. at 783, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
53. 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970).
54. People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. 3d 686, 694, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75, 527 P.2d 622,
627 (1974).
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murder."' 5 "Murder" in California does not designate any crime but
is a classificatory term; one is charged not with "murder" but with
"murder 1" or "murder 2." It would have been helpful had it been
said that, quite apart from felony-murder, one who initiates a gun
battle and so on is guilty of murder in the second degree. This not
only would have clarified the relevant law on that phase of the situa-
tion but also would have made it clear that, when second degree
murder is otherwise established, in contrast to cases where the felon
directly kills, there is then reliance on felony-murder to reach murder
in the first degree.
Much of this has been altered by People v. Antick.5 6 Antick and
Bose had committed a burglary, and later that same night police offi-
cers discovered a parked automobile that had previously aroused their
suspicion because it contained furniture and a stereo. Bose, seated
in the parked car and ordered out of it, fired at the officer and ran
away. Failing to stop when ordered to do so, he was shot and killed
by the officer. A few days later Antick was arrested and he was con-
victed of first degree murder of Bose. Antick was not with Bose when
the latter initiated the gun battle but was nearby, and it is not apparent
why it was necessary to apply the law on felony-murder especially
since the prosecutor on appeal conceded that the trial court's instruc-
tion on felony-murder was erroneous.7,
In any event, the opinion discussed the above decisions and re-
versed the conviction on two grounds: first, the felony-murder rule
was not applicable because the killing was by a police officer and.
second, vicarious liability was not applicable because Bose had not
killed anyone; he himself was killed. He, therefore, committed no
crime for which his accomplice Antick could be held liable. In this
latter holding the court relied on People v. Ferlin,58 where an arsonist
was burned to death while setting a fire, and the surviving accomplice,
Ferlin, who was not present, was acquitted of that homicide. It is
not likely that the conviction of felony-murder would have been up-
held even if Ferlin had been present. But analogy has no logical
limits, and for some there may be a persuasive similarity between being
burned by a fire one starts and being shot by one who resists a hold-
up. Ferlin and Antick may have reached a sound result simply on
55. 3 Cal. 3d at 583, 477 P.2d at 134, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 278 (emphasis added).
56. 15 Cal. 3d 79, 539 P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
57. Id. at 90 n.11, 539 P.2d at 50, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
58. 203 Cal. 587, 265 P. 230 (1928).
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the ground that co-felons who voluntarily engage in a dangerous
enterprise take the risk of that and that interpersonal legal duties do
not apply among them during that hazardous venture. That, how-
ever, was not the direction taken in Gilbert and Taylor.
Accordingly, the statement in Antick that felony-murder was not
applicable because the killing was not the direct act of a felon clouds
the fact that in the Gilbert-Taylor rationale, given murder in the
second degree, felony-murder is applicable to raise liability to murder
in the first degree; in that view, felony-murder is only held in abeyance
and becomes operative if murder in the second degree was committed.
With reference to the court's treatment of "vicarious liability" in
Antick, it should be noted that the act in issue in all these cases was
not solely the initiation of a gun battle; also in issue was the lethal
act of the policeman or of the intended victim. The initiation caused
the response and it was this response that killed; the causal question
is resolved by imputing the killing to the felons who actually or in the
legal view of complicity initiated the gun battle. As long ago as
1838 it was definitely recognized that "it is a principle of law, that if
several persons act together in pursuance of a common intent, every
act done in furtherance of such intent by each of them is, in law, done
by all."59 Thus, vicarious liability is not disposed of simply by asking
what crime did X commit for which his accomplice is vicariously
liable? Vicarious liability makes every co-felon guilty of every act of
his accomplices in furtherance of the felony. When Daniels shouted
his threats, the legal effect was the same as though all three had
initiated the gun battle. Following Gilbert and Taylor, all are liable
for the lethal response; the fact that one of the felons was killed does
not alter the criminal liability of the surviving felons, each of whom
in legal effect killed the dead felon.
Accordingly, although Antick can be distinguished from Gilbert
and Taylor (e.g., the relevant felony, burglary, had been completed
and the felons were not in flight, Antick at the time in issue was not
59. Alderson, B., in Macklin, Murphy and Others' Case, [1838] 168 Eng. Rep.
1136.
Accordingly, it was said in Taylor: "Therefore, the trier of fact may find that
Smith set into motion, through the intentional commission of acts constituting implied
malice and in furtherance of the robbery, a gun battle resulting in his own death.
Since petitioner may be held vicariously responsible for any killing legally attributable
to his accomplice, he may be charged with Smith's death." Taylor v. Superior Court,
3 Cal. 3d at 584, n.3, 447 P.2d at 135, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 279. For the corresponding
rule in criminal conspiracy, see R. PEmaNs, CnnrmnA. LAW 632 (2d ed. 1969).
assisting Bose to commit a felony, hence Bose's initiation of the gun
battle cannot be imputed to Antick) it is not easy to escape the im-
pression that Antick is inconsistent with Gilbert and Taylor in a much
wider sense than that implied in its expressed overruling of Taylor
only as regards the instruction there on vicarious liability based on
the dead felon's conduct.60 In addition to this departure from tradi-
tional vicarious liability, Antick made a problematic"' application of
the estoppel to Taylor's subsequent conviction based on Daniels' prior
acquittal; since Bose was dead and could not be convicted of any
crime, estoppel6- was also held to bar the conviction of Antick.
These holdings in Antick and the fact that in no case subsequent
to Gilbert has a final judgment affirmed that extension of the felony-
murder rule lead almost inevitably to the conclusion that the su-
preme court, despite the Antick avowal of substantial conformity with
Taylor,o a has in fact returned to the main thrust of Washington.
Indeed, in view of the widespread criticism of the felony-murder
rule, a more extensive judicial reappraisal of the California decisions
may be expected. As long as section 189 remains in the penal code
it must be applied and enforced, but there is nothing in the code
that requires a court to extend the felony-murder rule to killings by
a police officer or an intended victim. On the contrary, the restric-
tion of felony-murder to criminal homicides committed directly by
a felon in furtherance of the felony is supported by Washington and
the law of many states. There is nothing in the Code that requires
a court to bring accidental killings by a felon within the statute. On
the contrary, there is Justice Traynor's emphasis on "murder" not
"killing" in Thomas, a position which is supported by the Model Penal
Code's provision and the law of several states to the effect that the
criminal homicide must be committed "recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."I4
Finally, there is a third possible restriction that merits considera-
tion because it is a plausible limitation on traditional vicarious lia-
bility, namely restriction of felony-murder to the principal, thus ex-
cluding an accessory who did not solicit or aid the killing, was not
60. 15 Cal. 3d at 92 n.12, 539 P.2d at 51, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
61. See People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. 3d 686, 527 P.2d 622, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1974).
62. 15 Cal. 3d at 92, 539 P.2d at 51, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
63. Id. at 91, 539 P.2d at 50, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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armed and did not know that any co-felon was armed.65  This nar-
rowing of felony-murder is also supported by recent English decisions
(not regarding felony-murder since that is no longer law in England)
that, departing from the traditional rule that coercion is not a defense
to murder, allowed that defense to accessories who had no direct part
in the homicide.06
As regards all three of the suggested modifications of the present
California case law, it should be kept in mind that what is at issue
is murder in the first degree, not escape from very severe penalties
for the commission of other major felonies, and finally, of course, that
the felony-murder rule, even when it is restricted in the above ways,
contradicts a basic principle of criminal liability implying that punish-
ment for murder in the first degree should reflect and be limited by the
moral culpability expressed in the mens rea normally required for
murder in the first degree.
The problems discussed above represent only a few of those that
require study. Among others that are immediately suggested is the
extant law of conspiracy, especially clarification of the liability of
one who knowingly sells merchandise to conspirators but has no addi-
tional interest either in the conspiracy or its objectives.", There is
also the intriguing problem of criminal attempt, especially that raised
by the New York law to the effect that "legal impossibility" is no
longer a defense"s and by the decision of the House of Lords 0 which
explicitly approved People v. Jaffe70 and rejected People v. Roas.71
Again, there is section 4 of the California Penal Code,72 which, if not
a "dead letter,"7 3 has been reduced by judicial decision to little more
than a mere truism to refrain from deliberate circumvention of a
clearly expressed legislative intent. Among other persistent problems
65. This, in effect, is the law of New York. See N.Y. PENAL LAWv § 125.25(3)
(a)-(d) (McKinney 1975).
66. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653.
67. For a sweeping challenge, see Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy,
61 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1973).
68. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 110.10 (McKinney 1975).
69. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, [1975] A.C. 476, 497.
70. 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906).
71. 55 Cal. 2d 252, 358 P.2d 921, 10 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1961).
72. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1970).
73. See Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Bptr. 481
(1970); J. HALL, B. J. GEORGE, JR. & R. FORCE, CASES AND READINGS ON CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE 69-70 (3d ed. 1976).
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are those regarding error juris,74 "gross negligence,"7 strict liability,76
"transferred intent," and objective liability in homicide.7 7
Practical Conclusions
Just as an overall policy and congruent guidelines are necessary
to reform the substantive law so, too, the order and methods of reform
need to be analyzed, weighed and reflected on; in other words, just
as "due process" is often the best ground for thinking that the con-
clusions reached are sound, so too, with reference to the methods of
reform. We are, I believe, in a strategic position to plan the reform
of the criminal law because of our experience with the Model Penal
Code and the present availability of later similar projects in man)'
states and foreign countries, especially that of the English Criminal
Law Reform Committee, the Law Reform Commission of Canada, and
the studies in West Germany that led to the adoption there of a Penal
Code in 1975.78
Initial emphasis should be placed not on "codification" but on
"improvement." In the first place, "code" is ambiguous. In this
country it may mean simply that most penal statutes are placed alpha-
betically in a single volume or in the order in which they come from
the legislature. But in Europe, Latin America, Japan, and other
countries, a code is an organized relatively complete body of statutes
based on a set of fundamental principles.
Secondly, although we have travelled far from nineteenth century
Field-Carter debates on codification, the challenge to produce a penal
code in the European sense of that term is understandably disturbing
to many common law lawyers. The genius of the common law lies
in the richness of its case law and the consequent precision of analysis;
and California's criminal jurisprudence is an achievement that no one
wishes to diminish. Almost instinctively, the common law lawyer is
apprehensive that vague generalizations may be substituted for the
specificity of the case law, and novel terms for established ones
74. See Arzt, Ignorance or Mistake of Law, and Hall, Comment on Error Juris, in
Symposium: The New German Penal Code, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 589, 646, 680 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Symposium].
75. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(3)(a) (West 1970).
76. See LAW REFORM COMSMISSION OF CANADA, THE MEANING OF GUILT - STRICT
LA ILITY, (2-3 Working Paper 1974).
77. See Criminal Justice Act, 1967, c. 80, § 8 (Eng.).
78. See Symposium, supra note 74.
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that have been elucidated in thoughtful decisions. Nevertheless, it
should be possible to improve the criminal law without making such
sacrifices.79
There is another question regarding codification that raises doubts
not only among lawyers but also among lay persons; this concerns
major shifts in policy that may be recommended by the drafters in
far-reaching departures from the current law. For example, there
is considerable disagreement regarding penalties and that is most
pronounced regarding nonviolent offenders, some arguing that they
should not be imprisoned at all while others regard even the present
treatment of white collar offenders as unfairly lenient in comparison
with that imposed on the usually underprivileged offenders who fill
the prisons.8 0 There are sharp differences of opinion regarding the
so-called "victimless crimes," drug addiction, juvenile offenders, and
other major issues. The inordinate delay that besets adoption of the
proposed revision of the Federal Code was occasioned by vigorous
opposition to a single provision. More unfortunate than the loss of
time is the fact that this concentration of criticism has diverted at-
tention from the need to study the bulk of the proposed draft which
was very much influenced by the Model Penal Code.
The above problem was recognized from the outset of plans to
reform the English criminal law. In a memorandum addressed to
the Lord Chancellor, urging the appointment of a Criminal Law Re-
form Committee, the Society of Public Teachers of Law said: "Some
proposals for reform raise such wide issues of social policy that they
can be properly considered only by a body having broadly based mem-
bership, such as a Royal Commission."8' A royal commission would
include representative members of Parliament and of the Bar and,
probably, some very thoughtful lay persons. The adoption of some
such plan would go far to alleviate apprehension about a new code.
79. For a discussion of those problems in Canada where these issues are familiar
and insistent, see LAw REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, TowAmnS A CODIFICATION OF
CANADIAN CRIMnuNAL LAW (1976).
80. See Silving, Constitutional Fundamentals of Penal Legislation, 43 REv. JuR.
U.P.R. 141, 149-50 (1974); Symposium: Reflections on White-Collar Sentencing, 86
YALE: L.J. 589 (1977); and Andenaes, The Future of Criminal Law, 1971 Cium. L. REV.
615. On reform in several countries involving large policy questions, see The Politics
of Criminal Law Reform, 21 AM. J. Comp. L. 201 (1973), which includes Sherry, The.
United States at 201-29.
81. Memorandum from the Society of Public Teachers of Law addressed to the
Lord Chancellor setting out the case for the appointment of a Criminal Law Reform
Committee, 4 J. Soc. Put. T.L. 231 (1958).
It is only natural that committees in various states, assigned to
draft a code within three or four years, should rely on the Model Penal
Code for the most part and rest content with occasional departures
from it. The Model Penal Code was an important advance in many
ways, not least because in 1951, when work on it began, there were
helpful treatises and many excellent articles available to the draftsmen.
Nothing said here is intended to detract from that notable achieve-
ment. But there are important reasons for us to read it and statutory
departures from it critically and compare them with the reports of the
English Criminal Law Reform Committee, the reports of the Canadian
Law Reform Commission, and the 1975 Code of West Germany, bear-
ing in mind that it took more than ten years to produce the Model
Penal Code and that many more years of thorough study went into
the draft of the 1975 German Code.
This is hardly the place for a detailed analysis of the Model Penal
Code or discussion of all the questions raised about it that have de-
veloped in the fifteen years since its publication; only a few of them
can be briefly noted here. In the important field of theft, "asporta-
tion" was eliminated and "control" was employed. The reason seems
to have been that the drafters believed that criminal attempts should
be subjected to the same punishment as that imposed for the consum-
mated crimes. In any event, what is certain is that a vague concept
was substituted for a very definite common law term. To doubt the
wisdom of that change, it is necessary only to note the dissenting
opinion regarding "control" written by the distinguished Chief judge
Breitel of the New York Court of Appeals in which he insisted on
the retention of "asportation."''"
In another important area, that concerning insanity, the Model
Penal Code adopted two tests - a liberalized version of the NI'Naghten
rule and, as an independent alternative, an improved formulation of
the "irresistible impulse" test. Many have been impressed by the
adoption of the A.L.I. provision by almost all the federal courts and
several states. But the federal courts, for very questionable reasons,
had for many years adhered to the "irresistible impulse" test as well
as to M'Naghten. 3  The adoption of the Model Code's test was not
therefore the adoption of a substantially new rule; it was only the
82. People v. Alamo, 34 N.Y.2d 453, 460. 315 N.E.2d 446, 450, 358 N.Y.S.2d
375, 381 (1975).
83. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CnI.rJN-I|M LAW 502-04 (2d ed. 1960).
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substitution of better phrasing of the traditional M'Naghten terms
(especially "knew") and of "irresistible impulse" (to avoid the notion
of quick, impulsive action). What is far more significant than this
"adoption" by the federal courts and a number of states that simply
followed the Code without a thorough study of what was involved
is the fact that several states rejected the alternative test regard-
ing "conformity," among them New York8 4 and Pennsylvania,sa and
that other states, including California, have also retained a liberal
version of M'Naghten, rejecting "irresistible impulse" and equivalent
formulas8 6
Among other phases of the Model Penal Code that raise questions
are the proposed rule of unilateral conspiracy, the dubious meaning of
"gross negligence," the uncertain use of "purpose" 8 7 and other pro-
posed rules that have been criticized.8 Among its obvious achieve-
ments is the sustained effort to rid the law of a vast array of confusing,
disparate penalties by constructing a relatively simple classification
of felonies and misdemeanors; even that auspicious beginning has
been criticized.89
Important as are these and other issues, the most serious prob-
lem regarding penal codification in this country, no matter how com-
petently executed, results from two shortcomings: first, the notion
that adequate reform of the criminal law can be achieved by intensive
intermittent efforts every 30 or 40 years; and second, the failure even
in those sporadic efforts to report fully the relevant discussions and
supporting data as well as the dissenting opinions so that a record
is made that obviates the necessity of starting from scratch every time
penal reform is in vogue. We have only to contrast these self-im-
84. N.Y. PENALr LAw § 30.05 (McKinney 1975).
85. Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960).
86. People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
87. "Purpose" was not used as a separate category of mens rea in the Canadian
Law Reform Commission's Published Working Paper No. 31 (June 16, 1970). That
term and "knowingly" raise problems because they are involved in "intention" and
"reckless." This linguistic problem merits further study.
88. For criticism of the Model Penal Code, see Hall, Theft, Law and Society -
1968, 54 A.B.A.J. 960 (1968); Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUNl.
L. REv. 594, 599-600 (1963); Kuh, A Prosecutor Considers The Model Penal Code,
id. at 608; Perkins, Some Weak Points in the Model Penal Code, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 3
(1965).
89. Rubin, Sentencing and Correctional Treatment Under the Law Institute's Model
Penal Code, 46 A.B.A.J. 994 (1960). See Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and The
Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 465 (1961).
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posed limitations with the way penal reform is carried on in other
countries. In Germany, for example, reform of the criminal law is
a continuously ongoing enterprise. A new penal code was adopted
in 1975, the outcome of continuous efforts to improve the code of
1871 (itself the product of years of work) and later codes. '  These
efforts were accompanied by detailed reports of the contributions of
large numbers of specialists in penal law. Not only did this facilitate
the evaluation of proposed changes, it also helped later efforts to
reform the law. The implications are plain: improvement of the
criminal law should be a permanent ongoing enterprise and detailed
records should be kept.
A "working group" composed of a small number of representative
specialists who can devote most of their time to such reform should
report to a larger committee composed also of experts who are repre-
sentative at least of all branches of the profession and are willing to
take the time to study the working group's research and recommenda-
tions. A rational sequence in the study of problems should be ob-
served. For example, there are defects in the current Penal Code
and case law that can rather easily be repaired; some of them have
been discussed above and these obviously needed reforms can proceed
apace. Nor is there any reason to delay the organization of the exist-
ing statutes into a rational system; that would be an important step
in the direction of sound codification. Major legislative changes,
such as those recently enacted in California regarding sentences,"'
could be incorporated into these preliminary reforms. The subsequent
allocations of major problems and the methods to be employed in-
volve too many variables for helpful generalization. But "the limits
of judicial creativity,"12 the relative freedom of legislators, and the
resources available to scholars indicate guidelines for their collabora-
tion. It is worth emphasis that they now have readily available what
the drafters of the Model Penal Code did not have, namely, the Model
90. Notable peak years of reform were 1894, 1899, 1905-09, when, as a necessary
preparation for sound reform, a sixteen volume treatise on comparative criminal law
was published, 1911, 1913, 1919, 1922, 1925, 1927, 1930, 1952, 1954-59, 1962, 1966
when a detailed "alternative draft" was prepared by scholars dissatisfied with the
official draft, 1971 and 1975. See Oehler, Introduction - The Revision of the Penal
Code, in Symposium, supra note 62, at 592.
91. Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, Cal. Stat. 1977, ch. 165, at
602 (codified in scattered sections of CAL. CoaP. CODE, CAL. Gov'T CODE, CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE, CAL. ML. & VET. CODE, CAL. PENAL CODE, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE).
92. Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1025 (1978).
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Penal Code, itself, as well as the departures from it, the reports of
the English Criminal Law Reform Committee and of the Canadian
Law Reform Commission, and the 1975 Code of West Germany.
What is called for, in sum, is a fresh start in which the above and
other important publications are carefully appraised.
In comparison with what we now have, the initial product, pub-
lished, say ten years after the work began, could be a great advance.
If it were generally recognized that continuing efforts to improve any
penal code are necessary, one could tolerate those parts of it that fell
short of one's expectations, knowing that the book had not been closed
and that ongoing study and discussion will take us nearer to that
inevitably elusive "perfect penal code."

